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Why Annual Penetration Testing Is No Longer Enough in Today's Threat Landscape
Cybersecurity

Why Annual Penetration Testing Is No Longer Enough in Today's Threat Landscape

ITSEC AsiaITSEC Asia
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Jan 09, 2026 — 7 minutes read

If you only went to the doctor once a year, you probably would not assume you were perfectly healthy for the other 364 days. Health changes over time. New conditions can develop, existing issues can worsen, and unexpected problems may arise between checkups. That is why people increasingly rely on regular monitoring and preventive care rather than waiting for an annual appointment to discover something has gone wrong. Cybersecurity works in much the same way. For many years, annual penetration testing has been considered a cybersecurity best practice. Organizations schedule an assessment, receive a report, address the findings, and repeat the process the following year. In relatively static environments, this approach provided a reasonable level of assurance. Modern organizations, however, no longer operate in static environments. Cloud adoption has accelerated. APIs have become essential to digital services. Development teams deploy updates continuously, and third-party integrations have become increasingly common. As organizations move faster, their attack surfaces evolve just as quickly. A system that was secure six months ago may look very

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Your Vendors Hold Your Customer Data. Who Is Securing It?
Cybersecurity

Your Vendors Hold Your Customer Data. Who Is Securing It?

ITSEC AsiaITSEC Asia
|
Nov 20, 2026 — 4 minutes read

A company can have strong internal security controls and still face a data exposure through an external provider. That risk became visible on 19 November, when JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard disclosed separate incidents involving third-party service providers. The disclosures raised questions about how customer information is handled outside the systems that companies directly operate. The details differ. JPMorgan Chase said attackers may have accessed marketing data held by vendors, potentially including some customer names and email addresses. Mastercard reported that a limited number of email addresses belonging to a small subset of cardholders in a specific benefits programme had been exposed. Visa said claims were associated with an incident involving a third-party service provider in Asia-Pacific. It said its own systems were not involved and payment data, including card numbers, was unaffected. [1][2] These statements do not establish that all three companies were affected by one breach or shared the same provider. Each disclosure needs to be assessed on its own facts. The companies also said their core banking or

When the Server Managing Your Systems Becomes the Target
Cybersecurity

When the Server Managing Your Systems Becomes the Target

ITSEC AsiaITSEC Asia
|
Nov 19, 2026 — 3 minutes read

Organisations use configuration-management platforms to keep thousands of servers consistent. They automate software installation, apply security settings and distribute configuration changes across their infrastructure. That central role also makes these platforms attractive targets. On 17 November 2026, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalogue, citing evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerability affects Perforce Puppet Enterprise and Puppet Core and can allow remote code execution on a vulnerable Puppet Server. [1][2] The flaw is caused by improper deserialization of untrusted data in Puppet's report-processing functionality. In practical terms, a specially crafted report submitted by a client holding a certificate signed by the Puppet certificate authority can trigger code execution on the server, under the privileges of the Puppet service account. [2][3] The certificate requirement matters. An attacker generally needs a valid agent certificate. However, Neodyme's technical analysis explains that environments configured to automatically sign certificate requests without strong verification can make it possible for an attacker to obtain one without proper authorisation. [3] The consequences

Your Website Trusts the Script. Should Your Security Team?
Cybersecurity

Your Website Trusts the Script. Should Your Security Team?

ITSEC AsiaITSEC Asia
|
Nov 18, 2026 — 3 minutes read

On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was delivered to visitors of websites belonging to 178 organisations through Optimizely Web Experimentation. Security researcher Scott Helme identified 188 infected snippets among 1,611 examined. The affected organisations included major names in finance, retail, technology, media and travel. [1] The attacker inserted malicious code into customer projects within the experimentation platform. The original JavaScript snippet continued to load from Optimizely's legitimate content delivery domain. This meant that a website could receive compromised code through a source it had already approved. The payload attempted to replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses, capture payment card details entered into website forms, steal certain browser cookies and take screenshots. It also attempted to deliver exploit code targeting Apple mobile devices. Reuters reported that the extent of successful data theft and the number of affected visitors could not be established. [1][2] The technical issue goes beyond the compromised vendor. It exposes a weakness in how organisations define trust inside their browsers. A trusted domain is not a guarantee of trusted code. Many websites

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